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PUTTING THE "SUPER" INTO SUPERFUND'S ENTRY
AND INSPECTION PROVISIONS:
OUTBOARD MARINE CORP. v. THOMAS
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund)' in response
to the dangers to public health and the environment from abandoned
hazardous waste sites. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in-
terpreted CERCLA as conferring virtually unlimited enforcement powers
upon it to enter private property in response to environmental hazards,
even when those hazards present no imminent or substantial threat to
health or the environment. Although the government has a substantial
interest in protecting public health and the environment, 2 the EPA's
interpretation of the statute deprives property owners of fundamental
rights guaranteed by the fourth and fifth amendments to the United States
Constitution.
In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas,3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declared that the EPA's expansive inter-
pretation of its inspection and enforcement powers under CERCLA ex-
ceeded the authority actually conferred upon the EPA by Congress. The
court construed the entry and inspection provisions of CERCLA to pro-
hibit the EPA from entering private property, in nonemergency situations,
to perform preconstruction activities prior to the actual cleanup of a
hazardous waste site.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-
zation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The authority to collect taxes
under CERCLA expired on September 30, 1985. 42 U.S.C. § 9653 (1982). However, Congress
passed interim legislation to continue the hazardous waste cleanup program through August
1986. See 7 INSIDE EPA No. 34, at 14 (Aug. 22, 1986).
2. In 1979, the EPA estimated that 1,200 to 2,000 hazardous waste sites presented a
serious risk to the environment. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6120 (1979). The
Office of Technology Assessment now estimates that nationwide there may be as many as
10,000 abandoned hazardous waste sites eligible for cleanup under CERCLA. H.R. REP. No.
253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1985). The number can be expected to grow. The EPA's Office
of Solid Waste estimates that more than 650,000 businesses currently generate hazardous waste
in the United States. Berkey & Brown, Spreading the Word About the Job Under RCRA,
EPA J., Apr. 1986, at 15. There are over 60,000 chemicals in use in the United States and
every year another 1,000 industrial chemicals, 200 pesticides, 80 food additives, and 200 drugs
are developed as entirely new chemical entities. M. WOROBEK, Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL
PRIMER (1984).
3. 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985).
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In addition to invalidating the EPA's interpretation of its enforcement
power, the decision illustrates deficiencies in CERCLA's entry and inspection
provisions. In response to this decision, Congress has recently passed amend-
ments to CERCLA4 which clarify and strengthen the EPA's authority to
respond to environmental hazards.' Although Congress seeks to give the
EPA increased power and discretion to fully implement CERCLA, the
amendments may deny property owners adequate substantive and procedural
protection against arbitrary or unreasonable intrusions by the EPA. This
Note analyzes the deficiencies Outboard Marine found in CERCLA's entry
and inspection provisions. It also discusses whether the statutory amendments
that correct these deficiencies satisfy the fourth and fifth amendments.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation & Liability Act of 1980
Congress enacted CERCLA to protect public health and the environment
from the dangers of the nation's worst abandoned hazardous waste sites. 6
CERCLA directed the EPA 7 to investigate the potential threat to the public
posed by hazardous substances at those sites designated on the National
4. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (effective Oct. 17, 1986) [hereinafter SARA].
5. House Report No. 253 describes the purpose of the amendments to CERCLA's entry
and inspection provisions:
The Committee has been concerned that EPA has had difficulty gaining access
to facilities and gathering information or conducting cleanup activities necessary to
achieve the goals of Superfund. This provision clarifies and strengthens the authority
of EPA to achieve these tasks.
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (1985).
6. During the House debates held on September 19, 1980, Congressman Florio, sponsor
of the Superfund legislation, stated:
The goals of the legislation are to eliminate unsafe inactive hazardous waste sites
and to remove hazardous waste threats to public health and the environment in a
cost effective manner .... [The bill] establishes an information gathering and
analysis system. This system will enable Federal and State governments to charac-
terize inactive site problems more accurately and develop priorities for investigation
and response.
126 CoNG. REC. 26,338 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio).
7. Congress originally conferred the authority to act under CERCLA upon the President.
The President, by executive order, delegated his functions to the Administrator of the EPA,
subject to specified delegations to other agencies. See Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168
(1982), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,418, 3 C.F.R. 187 (1984).
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Priorities List.' In the event of an imminent and substantial endangerment9
8. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982). For the original text of section
104(a)(1) and discussion of the amendments, see infra note 81. CERCLA required that the
EPA establish a list of hazardous waste sites and update it annually. CERCLA § 105(8)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B) (1982). The National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1986), outlines
a Hazard Ranking System which requires the EPA to rank each site according to its priority
for cleanup based on the degree of hazard posed by the site. 40 C.F.R. app. A § 300 (1986).
Priority listing of hazardous waste sites was designed to insure that the most dangerous sites
would be addressed first. 126 CONG. REC. 26,342 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of
Rep. Lee). The final National Priorities List published in September 1983 contained 406 sites.
There are now 852 current and proposed sites on the list and the number is expected to grow
to between 2,000 and 4,000 in the next few years. Skinner, Research to Break the Land Disposal
Habit, EPA J., Apr. 1986, at 12; H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1985).
9. CERCLA did not define "imminent and substantial endangerment." Under section
106(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c) (1982), Congress has delegated to the EPA the authority to determine
when an imminent and substantial endangerment exists. The meaning of "imminent and
substantial endangerment" under section 106(c) is discussed in United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 845-46 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (discharge of higly
toxic compounds presents an imminent and substantial endangerment when there is a substantal
likelihood of human and environmental exposure), and United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem.
Corp. 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1109-10, 1114 (D. Minn. 1982) (discharge of toxic wastes and
carcinogens into the city's drinking water supply presents an imminent and substantial endan-
germent). "Imminent and substantial endangerment" has been used in other environmental
statutes. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1982); Resource Conservation & Recovery Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982). The meaning of "imminent and substantial endangerment" is
discussed in the House Committee Report accompanying section 1431 of the Safe Water Drinking
Act, which states:
'1l]mminence' must be considered in light of the time it may take to prepare
administrative orders or moving papers, to commence and complete litigation, and
to permit issuance, notification, implementation, and enforcement of administrative
or court orders to protect the public health.
Furthermore, while the risk of harm must be "imminent" for the Administrator
to act, the harm itself need not be. Thus, for example, the Administrator may
invoke this section when there is an imminent likelihood of the introduction into
drinking water of contaminants that may cause health damage after a period of
latency.
Among those situations in which the endangerment may be regarded as "sub-
stantial" are the following:
(1) a substantial likelihood that contaminants capable of causing adverse health
effects will be ingested by consumers if preventive action is not taken;
(2) a substantial statistical probability that disease will result from the presence
of contaminants in drinking water; or
(3) the threat of substantial or serious harm (such as exposure to carcinogenic
agents or other hazardous contaminants .... )
H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN.
NEws 6454, 6487-88. Courts have interpreted this standard in applying other environmental
statutes. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976) ("endanger means something less than actual harm');-Reserve-Mining Co. v.
EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 529 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (endangering-the health or welfare of persons
includes potential as well as actual harm); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,
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to public health or the environment because of an actual or threatened
release of hazardous substances, section 10610 of the Act authorized the EPA
to issue an administrative order that directed the responsible party to imple-
ment removal or remedial action." The EPA could also apply for an
injunction in federal court to compel the responsible party to clean up or
abate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances. Alternatively,
section 10412 authorized the EPA to perform the work itself through the use
of funds from the Hazardous Substance Response Fund (Superfund). 13 The
EPA could then sue the responsible party for reimbursement.' 4
CERCLA did not expressly provide the EPA with statutory authority to
obtain access to private property in nonemergency situations to effectuate
remedial action.' 5 The statute authorized EPA nonemergency access to private
property to inspect records and to determine whether a release of hazardous
substances had occurred.' 6 However, it was unclear whether and to what
439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (hazard may be "imminent" even if its impact will not be
apparent for many years); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 12 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20843 (E.D. Va. 1982) (no requirement that protective measures be limited to
actions taken after a crisis has arisen); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp, 489 F. Supp. 870,
876 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (determination of imminent and substantial endangerment must take into
account the toxicity or the substance and the likelihood of human or environment exposure).
10. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
11. "Removal," which is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), refers to emergency or crisis
measures, including "spill containment measures; measures required to warn the public of, and
protect it from acute damages; temporary evacuation and housing; [and] activities necessary to
close an existing water supply system." See also S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54
(1980). SARA does not change this definition. "Remedial action" was defined as "those actions
consistent with permanent remedy ... to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous sub-
stances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public
health or welfare or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1982). Section 101(d) of SARA
amends this to include the off-site transport of hazardous materials. "Response" includes both
removal and remedial action. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1982), amended by SARA § 101(d), 100
Stat. 1613, 1615 (1986). See also Deju & Calland, Cleanup of Inactive Hazardous Waste,
NAT. REsouRcEs & ENV'T, Fall 1985, at 10.
12. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982).
13. The bulk of funding for the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund has been
derived from revenues generated by a per barrel tax levied on domestic oil refinery operators
and crude oil importers and a tax on manufacturers, producers, and importers of feedstock
petrochemicals. Hazardous Substance Response Revenue Act of 1980, § 211, enacting in part
I.R.C. § 4611 (1982). The effect of SARA is to increase the tax rate from 0.79 cent per barrel
to 8.2 cents per barrel. SARA, § 512(b), 100 Stat. 1760, 1761 (amending I.R.C. § 4611 (1986)).
14. CERCLA §§ 104, 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1982).
15. But see United States v. Hardage, 18 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1685, 1686-87 (W.D.
Okla. 1983) (response actions may be taken without regard to whether a release or threat of
release presents an imminent and substantial endangerment).
16. CERCLA § 104(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(1) (1982). The EPA was to perform an in-
depth analysis of each site on the National Priorities List to determine whether remedial action
was necessary. V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
§ 5.29, at 739 n.50.2 (Cum. Supp. 1985). If the EPA determined that the release of a hazardous
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extent the EPA could enter private property and act beyond these limited
purposes.
B. The Warrant Clause and Procedural Due Process
1. Fourth Amendment Considerations
The fourth amendment guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures." The drafters of the Constitution intended to prohibit unrea-
sonable searches to protect the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary intrusions by government officials.18 Without consent of the indi-
vidual, a search of private property is presumptively unreasonable unless it
is authorized by a valid search warrant. 19 A warrant, however, may not be
issued unless there is a showing of probable cause for the search or seizure
and the warrant specifies the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. 20
In the 1967 companion cases of Camara v. Municipal Court2 and See v.
City of Seattle,22 the Supreme Court required warrants when owners did not
consent to administrative inspections of either commercial buildings or pri-
vate homes. 23 In Camara, the lessee of an apartment refused to consent to
a warrantless inspection by a housing inspector. The Court found that such
administrative searches constituted a significant intrusion upon privacy in-
terests protected by the fourth amendment.2 4 Camara established that the
standard of probable cause, which justifies the issuance of warrants for
administrative searches, may be based not only on evidence of an existing
violation, but also on a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative
substance, pollutant or contaminant did not present an "imminent and substantial endanger-
ment," no remedial action was to be taken. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 22 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1657, 1666 (D.C. Cir. 1985). For SARA's amendments to section 104(e), see infra notes
133-38 and accompanying text.
17. The fourth amendment provides in part: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. See Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the American Revolution, in THE
ERA OF THE AMERicAN REVOLUTION 40 (R. Morris ed. 1939). Early cases held that the fourth
amendment applied only when the search to be conducted was to procure evidence to be used
in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., In re Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261 (D. Nev. 1871); In re Meador,
16 F. Cas. 1294 (N.D. Ga. 1869).
19. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
20. The fourth amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
22. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
23. Camara, 387 U.S. at 540; See, 387 U.S. at 543.
24. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
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standards" for conducting the inspection have been satisfied.25 In See, the
owner of a commercial warehouse refused to submit to a warrantless in-
spection of the building by fire department officials. The Supreme Court
extended its holding in Camara and required a warrant for the entry of
commercial buildings.26
A major exception to the administrative warrant requirement was carved
out in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States.2 7 The Court held that
warrantless inspections of federally licensed alcoholic beverage dealerships
were permissible, based upon the long history of federal regulation of the
liquor industry.2" In Biswell v. United States29 the Court extended the Co-
lonnade exception to include federally licensed gun dealerships. Although
federal gun regulation did not have the deep historic roots found in Colon-
nade, the Court concluded that warrantless inspections were reasonable
because the government could enforce the statute only through frequent
unannounced inspections.3 0 In addition, such inspections posed only minimal
threats to the privacy interests of gun shop owners because a person involved
in a "pervasively regulated"'" business has no reasonable expectation of
privacy.3 2
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.," however, the Supreme Court reached a
result contrary to that in Colonnade. The Court found that section 8(a) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),3 4 which authorized in-
spections of business premises without a warrant, violated the fourth amend-
25. Id. at 538. The Court disagreed that varying the probable cause standard from that
applied in criminal cases would authorize a "synthetic search warrant." Id. at 538-39. Applying
a reasonableness standard would insure that inspections of private property were justified by a
valid governmental interest. Id. at 539.
26. See, 387 U.S. at 546.
27. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
28. Id. at 77.
29. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
30. Id. at 316. The Court stated that an inspection may proceed without a warrant only
when it is expressly authorized by statute. Id. at 317.
31. Id. at 316. The Supreme Court has upheld non-consensual warrantless inspections of
mines and quarries under the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 813
(1982). See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05 (1981) (the mining industry was pervasively
regulated and the regulatory scheme provided adequate safeguards for the fourth amendment
rights of mine owners). The Court has also upheld warrantless inspections by the Food and
Drug Administration. See, e.g., United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, 651 F.2d
532, 539 (8th Cir. 1981) (warrant not required to inspect pharmaceutical manufacturer's premises
because industry pervasively regulated); United States v. New England Grocers Supply Co., 488
F. Supp. 230, 238 (D. Mass. 1980) (warrant not required to inspect food warehouse under
"pervasively regulated" warrant exception). But see United States v. Roux Laboratories, Inc.,
456 F. Supp. 973, 977 & n.2 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (warrant required to inspect and collect dye
samples because industry not "pervasively regulated").
32. 406 U.S. at 316.
33. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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ment." In Barlow's, an OSHA inspector tried to conduct a warrantless
inspection of nonpublic employee working areas of an electrical and plumbing
installation business. Relying on rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment,
the company refused to admit the inspector without a valid search warrant.
The Secretary of Labor argued that businesses involved in interstate com-
merce had long been subjected to close government supervision of employee
safety and health conditions and that the inspection fell within the Colon-
nade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement. The Barlow's Court,
however, rejected this argument and distinguished Colonnade and Biswell
on the ground that the employer's workplace was not a pervasively regulated
or licensed business.16 The Court, therefore, required a warrant to insure
35. 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978). The Barlow's decision has been the subject of many com-
mentaries. See Harmon, Defining the Contours of OSHA Inspection Warrants, 48 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 105 (1981); Jacobs, Warrantless OSHA Inspections, 85 CASE & COM. 15 (May-June
1980); O'Brien, Administrative Agency Searches Since Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Probable
Cause Requirements for Nonroutine Administrative Searches, 70 GEo. L.J. 1183 (1982); Rader,
OSHA Warrants and Administrative Probable Cause, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 97 (1981); Reed &
Davison, Employee Complaints and the Scope of OSHA Inspections: Heading for a Showdown?,
19 AM. Bus. L.J. 186 (1981); Rothstein, OSHA Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
1979 DUKE L.J. 63; Shipley, Warrantless Administrative Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 40 Omo ST. L.J. 81 (1979); Comment, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amend-
ment's Warrant Requirements, 32 ARK. L. RaV. 755 (1979); Comment, The Fourth Amendment
and Administrative Inspections, 16 Hous. L. REV. 399 (1979); Comment, Searches by Admin-
istrative Agencies After Barlow's and Tyler: Fourth Amendment Pitfalls and Short-Cuts, 14
LAND & WATER L. REv. 207 (1979); Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Administrative
Search-The Probable Cause Requirement After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 5 N. Ky. L. REv.
219 (1978); Comment, Administrative Roulette: Safety Inspection Probable Cause in Light of
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 768 (1979); Comment, Administrative Law:
Administrative Inspection Procedure, 18 WAsmBuRN L.J. 325 (1979); Comment, The Warrant
Requirement for OSHA Inspections: The Supreme Court Establishes a Two-Tiered Test For
Probable Cause, 15 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 61 (1978); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Are
Employer's Fourth Amendment Rights Protected?, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 161 (1980); Note,
Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Require-
ment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1979); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Administrative
Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 9 ENVTL. L. 149 (1978); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc. and the Warrant Requirement for OSHA "Spot Check" Inspections, 15 IDAHO L. REV.
187 (1978); Note, A Modern Approach to the Fourth Amendment: The Reconciliation of
Individual Rights with Governmental Interests, 39 LA. L. REv. 623 (1979); Note, FDA, EPA,
and OSHA Inspections-Practical Considerations in Light of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 39
MD. L. REv. 715 (1980); Note, "Knock, Knock" Is No Joke: Announcement Rules for Business
Premises, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 1666 (1983); Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77
MICH. L. REv. 1291 (1979); Note, Procedures for Attacking OSHA Inspection Warrants, 66
VA. L. REv. 983 (1980).
36. 436 U.S. at 314-15. The Court stated:
It is quite unconvincing to argue that the imposition of minimum wages and
maximum hours on employers who contracted with the Government under the
Walsh-Healey Act prepared the entirety of American interstate commerce for reg-
ulation of working conditions to the minutest detail. Nor can any but the most
fictional sense of voluntary consent to later searches be found in the single fact
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that the inspection was reasonable under the Constitution and was authorized
by the statute.3 7 Finally, the warrant served to advise the owner of the scope
of the inspection and the objects sought. 3a
2. Fifth Amendment Considerations
The fifth amendment prohibits the issuance of a search warrant upon ex
parte application, if the issuance will deprive the party to be searched of
procedural due process. 39 In Barlow's, the Secretary of Labor argued that
ex parte warrants were necessary to enable the agency to examine working
conditions without allowing the employer an opportunity to make alterations
or to take precautions.4 The Court agreed, recognizing that the statutory
scheme of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 4 permitted the issuance
of ex parte warrants.42
The authority to procure such a warrant was disputed in Cerro Metal
Products v. Marshall.43 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals required an
adversary, rather than an ex parte, proceeding when the Secretary of Labor
applied for an administrative search warrant. 44 Recent decisions have upheld
ex parte warrants when the government requires unannounced or emergency
access to private property to inspect the premises for compliance with the
law or for the presence of hazardous conditions.45 Such ex parte proceedings
are justified on the ground that prior notice would alert the person to be
that one conducts a business affecting interstate commerce; under current practice
and law, few businesses can be conducted without having some effect on interstate
commerce.
Id. at 314.
37. Id. at 323.
38. Id.
39. The fifth amendment states that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40. 436 U.S. at 316.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
42. 436 U.S. at 317-19, 320 n.15.
43. 467 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). The lower court
held that existing OSHA regulations did not authorize the Secretary of Labor to procure an
inspection warrant ex parte. 467 F. Supp. at 871. In response to the lower court's decision,
OSHA, without notice and comment rulemaking, amended its regulations'to provide for the
issuance of ex parte warrants. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(d) (1986).
44. 620 F.2d 954, 973 (3d Cir. 1980). The court further held that OSHA's amendment of
its regulations to allow for the issuance of ex parte warrants without notice and comment
rulemaking was not controlling. Id.
45. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 511 F. Supp. 744, 749-50 (M.D. Tenn. 1981)
(adversary hearing would allow business to shift into temporary compliance with the Clean Air
Act), rev'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 464 U.S. 165 (1984); United
States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 568 F.2d 853, 858 (2d Cir. 1977) (adversary hearing would
allow taxpayer to "secrete or dissipate what assets he had left").
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searched, who would then presumably bring himself into temporary com-
pliance with the law.46
C. Eminent Domain and the Just Compensation Clause
The power of eminent domain allows the federal government to appro-
priate private property for public use. 47 This power, derived from national
sovereignty, is implicit in the fifth amendment's guarantee that no private
property will be taken for public use without just compensation. 4 There are,
however, crucial preconditions to the use of such authority.
Eminent domain may only be exercised pursuant to legislative authoriza-
tion.49 Although the power may be implied from a statute, an administrative
agency may exercise eminent domain authority only if Congress's intent to
grant that power is unequivocal.' 0 The government may not appropriate
private property unless the taking is for a public use." A use is "public" if
it furthers health, welfare, safety, moral, social, economic, political, or
aesthetic goals. 2 Courts view such uses as "public" if there is public ad-
vantage or benefit even though the property is not used by the public. 3
46. 511 F. Supp. at 749-50. The Stauffer court found that an ex parte search warrant was
necessary to preserve the element of surprise in inspections conducted to determine the company's
compliance with the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (1982).
47. "Eminent domain" is the right of the sovereign to acquire private property for public
use upon making just compensation. A. JAHR, LAW oF EMINENT DoxAtw 2-3 (1953). The
existence of federal eminent domain power was initially recognized by the Supreme Court in
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373 (1876). Prior to that time, the federal government
pursued condemnation proceedings in state courts. Id.
48. Specifically, the fifth amendment states in part: "[Pirivate property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment
restraint on eminent domain power is applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
49. Section 14 of title 41 of the U.S. Code specifically provides that "[n]o land shall be
purchased on account of the United States, except under a law authorizing such purchase." 41
U.S.C. § 14 (1982). See, e.g., Delaware L. & W.R.R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 192
(1928) (authority to condemn private property must be clearly expressed in statute).
50. 276 U.S. at 192. The Supreme Court stated, "[Ilt -is to be borne in mind that the
taking of private property for public use is deemed to be against the common right and authority
to do so must be clearly expressed." Id. Accord United States v. 67.59 Acres of Land, 415 F.
Supp. 544, 547 (M.D. Pa. 1976); United States v. 20.53 Acres of Land, 263 F. Supp. 694, 696-
97 (D. Kan. 1967).
51. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
52. Id. at 32-33. The Court observed that:
"[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled."
Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
53. The view that "public use" is synonymous with "use by the public" was rejected by
the Supreme Court some time ago. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama
Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
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Once it is determined that the taking is for a public use and is within the
legislative grant of authority, the necessity of the taking is within the
discretion of the agency and is not subject to judicial review.5 4
In addition, a government agency may exercise eminent domain only if
the agency gives the property owner full and adequate compensation." The
fifth amendment's just compensation clause was designed to prevent the
government from requiring individuals to bear public burdens which should
be borne by the public as a whole.5 6 Thus, the government is obligated to
pay just compensation when its activities constitute a "taking" within the
meaning of the fifth amendment . 7 The reported decisions58 establish no set
54. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (court will inquire only into whether Congress asserted that
the taking was for the public good); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709
(1923) (necessity for exercise of eminent domain not a judicial question); Bragg v. Weaver, 251
U.S. 57, 58 (1919) (due process does not require hearing on state's method of determining
necessity).
55. Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 573, 575 (1898). The just compen-
sation required by the Constitution is that which constitutes "a full equivalent for the property
taken." Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). The com-
pensation is to be measured by the owner's loss rather than the taker's gain. United States ex
rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1943).
56. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (government required to compensate
creditor when property subject to lien destroyed). See also L. TRIBE, AmaicANt CoNsrrrrsoNAL
LAW §§ 9-1 to 9-4 (1980) (compensation f6r takings by government) [hereinafter TRIBE].
57. It is important to distinguish between eminent domain and the government's police
power. Eminent domain involves the taking of private property for public use while the police
power involves the regulation of private property in the public interest. See 1 NICHOLS, TiH
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42 (3d ed. 1964). See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
58. The environmental cases which have addressed the taking issue do not establish any
clear guidelines to determine when a taking has occurred. Compare Maine v. Johnson, I Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1970) (denial of fill permits to persons owning
marshlands in furtherance of state's conservation program constitutes a taking) with Candlestick
v. San Francisco Bay, 2 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1075 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (denial of fill permit
not a taking) and Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1208
(N.H. Sup. Ct. 1984) (denial of fill permit not a taking) and Smithwick v. Alexander, 17 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2126 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (denial of fill permit not a taking). Compare City of
Walla Walla v. Conkey, 3 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1731 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (pollution of
creek from untreated and partially treated sewage constitutes a taking) with Cabrera v. Munic-
ipality of Bayamon, 10 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1723 (1st Cir. 1977) (water pollution from
improperly constructed municipal sanitary landfill not a taking). Compare Leet v. Montgomery
County, 3 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1821 (Md. Ct. App. 1972) (requiring property owner to
remove abandoned automobiles dumped on his property constitutes a taking) with Price v. City
of Junction, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1693 (5th Cir. 1983) (city ordinance ordering removal
of junked vehicles not a taking). Compare New Jersey v. Board of Educ., 3 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1971) (noise pollution created by traffic on highway constitutes
a taking) with Nestle v. Santa Monica, 4 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1080 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1971)
(noise pollution created by jet aircraft not a taking). Compare Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United
States, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (prohibition of mining by owners of
coal deposits under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act constitutes a taking) and
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formula to determine when a taking has occurred,5 9 and in addition, the
Supreme Court has not clarified this area. It has merely inquired whether
"justice and fairness" require that the government compensate for economic
loss caused by government action.60 A taking is almost always found, how-
ever, when there is an actual appropriation or a permanent physical invasion
of private property by the government. 6'
When private property is needed for a public purpose, Congress may
authorize the taking of property either by proceedings in state court with
the state's consent, or in federal courts, with or without the state's consent. 62
Due process requires that, when exercising eminent domain, the government
give the property owner reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to
be heard .63 An agency upon which Congress has conferred eminent domain
Skaw v. United States, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (prohibition of mining
for preservation of river under National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act constitutes a taking) with
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (3d Cir. 1985)
(regulation of mining to prevent subsidence of surface land not a taking) and Bureau of Mines
v. George's Creek Coal Co., 7 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1001 (Md. Ct. App. 1974) (prohibition
of strip mining not a taking); and Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1027 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (prohibition of surface mining within one hundred feet of cemetery not
a taking); and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1676 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (regulation of mining to prevent subsidence of surface land not a taking).
Compare Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1943 (Cl. Ct. 1985)
(denial of permit to mine limestone constitutes a taking) with Sucesion Suarez v. Gelabert, 19
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1406 (1st Cir. 1983) (denial of permit to extract sand not a taking).
59. A number of approaches have been suggested by both commentators and the courts.
The principle approaches include: (1) the invasion theory (compensation will be granted only
if the government has taken title or physical possession of the property); (2) the noxious use
test (regulation without compensation is justified when the use is noxious, wrongful, or socially
undesirable); (3) the cause of harm test (regulation without compensation is justified when the
property owner created the harm); and (4) the diminution of value theory (legally acquired
economic values may not be excessively diminished without just compensation). For a compre-
hensive discussion of these theories, see Sax, supra, note 57, at 46-60.
60. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The Court
has also stated that property is taken when it is destroyed, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. 166, 177-78 (1872), or when its use is severely impaired to the extent that a servitude has
been acquired by the government. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.§74, 748 (1947).
61. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (imposition of a
navigational servitude resulted in a physical invasion requiring just compensation); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (taking more readily found when
interference with property is a physical invasion). See also TRIBE, supra note 56, at 461. Tribe
suggests that a clear case of taking is a "physical takeover of a distinct entity, with an
accompanying transfer of the legal powers of enjoyment and exclusion that are typically
associated with rights of property." Id.
62. Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1896).
63. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59 (1919). See also Note, Eminent Domain-Inadequate
Notice in Condemnation Proceedings: The Engimatic Title Becomes an Equitable Lien, 17
WAKE FoREST L. REv. 801, 811-13 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Eminent Domain]. Due process
does not require that the condemnation occur in advance of its occupation by the condemning
authority, Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 205 (1945), nor does it require a hearing on the
necessity and expediency of the taking. Bragg, 251 U.S. at 58.
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power is not always required to follow formal condemnation proceedings . 4
Rather, the agency may follow alternative procedures. 65 The agency may
take the property pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act,"6 after filing
a declaration of taking and depositing the amount of estimated compensation
with the court. Alternatively, the agency may simply take physical possession
of the property, leaving the property owner to pursue his remedies under
the Tucker Act. 67 The Tucker Act, however, does not provide a remedy for
a taking that is not authorized by Congress.6 1 In addition, the federal Uniform
Real Property Acquisition Act 69 establishes guidelines for the valuation of
property and determination of just compensation.
64. Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937). Rule 71A of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes a specialized procedure for the condemnation of
property in federal courts. FED. R. Crv. P. 71A.
65. Formal condemnation proceedings are normally required under the Uniform Real
Property Acquisition Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4651-4655 (1982), which provides:
If any interest in real property is to be acquired by the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, the head of the Federal agency concerned shall institute formal
condemnation proceedings. No Federal agency head shall intentionally make it
necessary for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking
of his real property.
42 U.S.C. § 4651(8) (1982).
66. 40 U.S.C. § 258a-f (1982).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). Historically, the sovereign immunity doctrine has been an
obstacle to landowners seeking compensation. See Note, Eminent Domain, supra note 63, at
804-05. The doctrine provides that the United States may not be sued without its consent.
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1934). Persons whose private property has been
taken without formal condemnation proceedings may sue for damages under the Tucker Act,
since the United States has waived its immunity in contract actions and actions founded upon
the Constitution. The Tucker Act provides:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express
or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages
in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).
68. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335 (1910). The Court determined that the Tucker
Act confers jurisdiction on the U.S. Court of Claims to determine claims against the government
"founded upon the Constitution":
It cannot be said that any claim for a specific amount of money against the United
States is founded on the Constitution, unless such claim be either expressly or by
necessary implication authorized by some valid enactment of Congress .... If an
officer of the United States assumes, by virtue alone of his office, and without
the authority of Congress, to take such matters under his control, he will not in
any legal or constitutional sense, represent the United States, and what he does
or omits to do, without the authority of the Congress, cannot create a claim against
the government, founded upon the Constitution.
Id.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4651-4655 (1982).
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In enacting CERCLA, Congress did not expressly confer eminent domain
authority upon the EPA. Thus, prior to the 1986 amendments, the EPA did
not have the power to take physical possession of private property under
any of the foregoing alternatives. Outboard Marine presented the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals with the task of construing the underlying statutory
language of CERCLA and reconciling its statutory interpretation with con-
stitutional requirements.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Outboard Marine owned and operated a large industrial complex in Wau-
kegan, Illinois. The complex was partially situated on a thirty acre tract of
uncontaminated land directly adjacent to Waukegan harbor. In 1976, the
EPA determined that bottom sediments in harbor slip no. 3 and in parts of
Outboard Marine's north property were contaminated with polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs). Allegedly, Outboard Marine's die cast operations were
the source of the contamination.
70
Eight years later,7 ' the EPA decided to conduct remedial action pursuant
to section 10472 of CERCLA, with the option of bringing a subsequent cost
recovery action against Outboard Marine under section 107.73 In accordance
with its remedial action plan, the EPA intended to construct large dewatering
lagoons and batch plants on Outboard Marine's uncontaminated harbor-
front property.74 The agency planned to dredge sediments from the harbor
and to transport them to the lagoons for treatment. After treatment, some
of the sediments were to be shipped off site. The remaining sediments were
to be permanently stored in a fifteen foot high containment cell which the
EPA intended to construct on six acres of the company's north property.7"
The entire project was to take three and one half years.
Prior to undertaking the planned construction, the EPA sought to conduct
"Phase I" of the cleanup plan, which consisted of a "walk-through"
inspection of the company's premises to survey the site, set permanent
markers, and collect numerous soil borings. The EPA intended to conduct
70. The Outboard Marine site was subsequently ranked forty-four on the National Priorities
List and was the number one site in Illinois. There has been no judicial determination as to
Outboard Marine's liability for the PCB contamination.
71. In 1978, the EPA filed suit against Outboard Marine in federal court seeking to compel
the company to dredge and remove PCBs from the harbor and its north property pursuant to
section 106 of CERCLA. In 1983, after extensive discovery and sampling, the EPA voluntarily
moved to dismiss the suit. The district court dismissed the case in 1984 over Outboard Marine's
objection. See United States v. Outboard Marine, 104 F.R.D. 405 (N.D. Il. 1984), aff'd, 789
F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
72. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982).
73. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
74. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Outboard Marine Corp. at 9, Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Thomas, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant].
75. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 74, at 11-12.
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this inspection over a seventy day period. The inspection alone would have
required numerous personnel and equipment, including truck-mounted drill-
ing rigs, pickup trucks, vans, water trucks, automobiles, a waste hauler, a
job trailer, and a bulldozer. 76 When Outboard Marine refused to permit
access to its property, the EPA obtained an ex parte search warrant from a
federal magistrate. Armed with the warrant, EPA inspectors appeared un-
announced at the company's premises and demanded access. Outboard
Marine again refused entry and moved to quash the warrant. When the
magistrate denied the company's motion, Outboard Marine sued in federal
court, seeking a reversal of the magistrate's order and a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent the EPA from executing the warrant until evidence could be
heard on the merits.
In the lower court, Outboard Marine argued that CERCLA did not
authorize the EPA to enter private property for the purpose of conducting
preconstruction work and that the proposed activities would constitute an
unauthorized taking in violation of the fifth amendment. 77 The district court
held that, assuming the EPA's described activities did constitute a com-
pensable taking under the fifth amendment, section 104(b) of the statute
authorized the agency's entry to conduct these activities. 7s Because the taking
was authorized by the statute, the court reasoned that the company could
pursue remedies available under the Tucker Act to obtain compensation. 79
The EPA's victory, however, was short lived. Finding a complete lack of
statutory authority for the EPA's entry under CERCLA, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed.8 0
III. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
The appellate court made several threshold determinations concerning the
provisions of CERCLA and their interplay with existing constitutional safe-
guards. Initially, the court interpreted section 104(a)8' of the Act to be a
76. 773 F.2d at 885.
77. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
78. Id. at 1240-42.
79. Id. at 1241.
80. 773 F.2d at 890.
81. Section 104(a)(1) provided:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat
of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat
of a release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may
present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the
[EPA] is authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove
or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal
from any contaminated natural resource), or take any other response measure
consistent with the national contingency plan which the [EPA] deems necessary to
protect the public health or welfare or the environment, unless the [EPA] determines
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general grant of power which authorized the EPA to undertake remedial
action to protect public health and the environment. s2 Contrary to the lower
court's finding, the court of appeals found that section 104(b),8 which
authorized entry to investigate whether or not a release of hazardous sub-
stances had occurred, was inapplicable to this case because the EPA had
already determined that PCBs had been released.8 4 The EPA had relied on
section 104(b), which also authorized the EPA to undertake planning, legal,
fiscal, economic, engineering, architectural, and other studies or investiga-
tions as it deemed necessary or appropriate "to plan and direct response
actions, to recover the costs thereof, and to enforce the provisions of this
chapter." 85 The EPA argued that, in order to plan response actions, it needed
access to the site. 6 Thus, the EPA contended that Congress had implicitly
granted it the authority to enter private property.8 7 The court flatly disagreed
with this statutory construction, and found that the Act did not entitle the
EPA to enter the premises to conduct planning activities when it could not
establish that it would ever be entitled to enter the property to undertake
the actual response action. 8 Since the EPA admitted that it would have to
that such removal and remedial action will be done properly by the owner or
operator of the vessel or facility from which the release or threat of release emanates,
or by any other responsible party.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). SARA deleted the italicized portion and instead
spells out more rigorous requirements for allowing an owner or operator to perform a cleanup.
SARA, § 104(a), 100 Stat. 1613, 1617-18 (1986).
82. 773 F.2d at 888-89.
83. Section 104(b) provided:
Whenever the [EPA] is authorized to act pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, or whenever the [EPA] has reason to believe that a release has occurred
or is about to occur, or that illness, disease, or complaints thereof may be attrib-
utable to exposure to a hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant and that a
release may have occurred or be occurring, [the EPA] may undertake such inves-
tigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information gathering as [the
EPA] may deem necessary or appropriate to identify the existence and extent of
the release or threat thereof, the source and nature of the hazardous substances,
pollutants or contaminants involved, and the extent of danger to the public health
or welfare or to the environment.
CERCLA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1982). Under SARA, this has been retained as section
104(b)(1) of CERCLA. 100 Stat. 1613, 1618 (1986).
84. 773 F.2d at 889.
85. Section 104 also provides:
In addition, the President may' undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic,
engineering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as he may deem
necessary or appropriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover the costs
thereof, and to enforce the provisions of this chapter.
CERCLA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1982).
86. Brief for the Appellees at 27-28, Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883 (7th
Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Brief for the Appellees].
87. The EPA acknowledged that section 104(b) provided no specific right of entry. 773
F.2d at 889.
88. Id.
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petition a federal court for the right of entry before it could begin the actual
construction, 9 the court found it "difficult to conclude" that Congress
implicitly granted (rather than failed to grant) a right of entry for the
purposes of conducting preliminary construction work.9°
In addition, the court found that section 104(e), 91 the section most heavily
relied upon by the EPA to establish its authority to enter the company's
premises, did not authorize access by the EPA to effectuate a response.
Section 104(e) expressly limited the EPA's authority to enter property and
inspect records for "the purposes specified in the preceding sentence." '92
Since the preceding sentence in the statute read "[flor the purposes of...
determining the need for response . . . or enforcing the provisions of this
subchapter," 9 the EPA creatively piggy-backed these two provisions and
concluded that this language should be read as a broad grant of authority.
The court, however, did not agree. Finding that section 104(e), read in its
entirety, limited the EPA's authority to inspect records, obtain samples, and
gather other information concerning the hazardous substance itself, the court
89. Counsel for the EPA advised the court that for the purpose of gaining access to
Outboard Marine's property for the actual construction:
[W]e probably would be filing an affirmative action in the district court ...
maybe something in terms of a declaratory judgment, some action like that. I am
not exactly sure of the exact form it would take .... But what it would be is
something in aid of entry, and that defendants be ordered not to interfere with the
construction. It would be a formal pleading filed with the district court.
Record at 3-4 (Apr. 24, 1985). In its brief, the EPA stated that it "fully acknowledge[d], as it
stated to the district court, that it will require further judicial process to obtain access to
implement the actual remedy." Brief for the Appellees, supra note 86, at 17.
90. 773 F.2d at 889.
91. Section 104(e) provided:
For purposes of assisting in determining the need for response to a release under
this subchapter or enforcing the provisions of this subchapter, any person who
stores, treats, or disposes of, or, where necessary to ascertain facts not available at
the facility where such hazardous substances are located, who generates, transports,
or otherwise handles or has handled, hazardous substances shall, upon request of
any officer, employee, or representative of the [EPA], duly designated by the
[EPA], or upon request of any duly designated officer, employee, or representative
of a State, where appropriate, furnish information relating to such substances and
permit such person at all reasonable times to have access to, and to copy all records
relating to such substances. For the purposes specified in the preceding sentence,
such officers, employees, or representatives are authorized-
(A) to enter at reasonable times any establishment or other place where such
hazardous substances are to have been generated, stored, treated, or disposed
of, or transported from;
(B) to inspect and obtain samples from any person of any such substance and
samples of any containers or labeling for such substances. Each such inspection
shall be commenced and completed with reasonable promptness.
CERCLA § 104(e)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) (1982).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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rejected the EPA's novel, expansive reading of this provision.94 Section
104(e), therefore, did not authorize entry for purposes of actually carrying
out the remedy. 9 The court noted that the statute specifically limited entry
upon private property to those places where the hazardous substances are
or have been generated, stored, treated, disposed of, or transported from.
96
Thus, the court questioned whether the uncontaminated tract of Outboard
Marine's property properly fit into that category.
97
. Despite the EPA's interest in protecting public health and the environment,
the court determined that, in nonemergency situations, the EPA's entry
pursuant to an ex parte search warrant fell short of constitutional require-
ments. 9 The court distinguished this case from an emergency situation, in
which section 106(a) expressly provided the EPA with broad power to "secure
such relief as may be necessary to abate a release or threat of release," and
granted jurisdiction to district courts to order "such relief as the public
interest and the equities of the case may require." 99 Since Congress had
expressly limited those powers to emergency situations, the court found that
such powers did notextend to nonemergencies situations.'0°
The court observed that, in effect, the EPA sought a temporary easement
on Outboard Marine's property. The EPA, however, could not acquire such
an easement because the statute did not expressly provide the agency with
eminent domain authority.l10 In refusing to imply authority, the court stated
that only Congress could grant eminent domain power. 102 Finally, because
the agency had no eminent domain authority, the Tucker Act did not afford
Outboard Marine a remedy for the taking. 103
IV. ANALYsIs
The court's decision to reject the EPA's expansive interpretation of its
entry and inspection powers was substantially consistent with the underlying
statute, its legislative history, other judicial decisions, and public policy. The
appellate court declared that CERCLA did not authorize the EPA to enter
private property in nonemergency situations to undertake removal or remedial
action. In nonemergency cases, the statute empowered the EPA to enter
private property only to determine whether a release had occurred, and
94. 773 F.2d at 889.
95. Id. at 889-90.
96. Id. at 890 n.6. See supra note 91.
97. 773 F.2d at 890 n.6.
98. Id. at 890.
99. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). This authority has not been changed by
SARA.
100. 773 F.2d at 890.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 891.
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limited the scope of the investigation to the hazardous substance itself.' °4
Based upon the court's findings in Outboard Marine, the EPA could not
remedy the admittedly hazardous conditions which existed at the site. Al-
though the court's interpretation of the Act at first appears unduly narrow,
this construction is consistent with Congress's stated priority of cleaning up
the nation's worst abandoned hazardous waste sites before addressing less
serious hazards.,05 As evidenced by the legislative history, Congress directed
the EPA to clean up those sites which presented an imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health and the environment. 1°6 The EPA was to
establish a priority listing of hazardous waste sites to ensure that the worst
sites were cleaned up first. 07 This requirement is the genesis of the National
Priorities List which sets out sites thought to present an imminent and
substantial threat to health and the environment. Congress gave the EPA
broad authority to act when there was an imminent and substantial threat
to public health or the environment.10 The court noted, however, that
Congress limited the EPA's powers to emergency situations. Conversely, the
court found that Congress did not authorize the EPA to enter private
property and to expend limited Superfund monies to carry out a project,
absent the requisite substantial threat to health or the environment.
The court's decision at first appears inconsistent with its own statutory
analysis. The Outboard Marine site initially ranked forty-four on the National
Priorities List and was the highest priority site in Illinois. 1°9 Why then did
the court fail to find that the EPA had broad power under CERCLA to
take remedial action at the site? The answer appears to be that the EPA
conceded that the site presented no imminent or substantial endangerment
to public health or the environment." 0
The location of most of the contamination in the harbor complicated the
situation because it was substantially inaccessible to the EPA except from
Outboard Marine's premises. CERCLA expressly allowed EPA entry only
to those facilities"' where the hazardous substances were or had been gen-
erated, stored, treated, disposed, or transported."' Because Outboard
Marine's harbor-front property was neither contaminated nor contiguous to
the remedial project, CERCLA did not authorize the EPA to enter that
104. CERCLA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1982).
105. See supra note 6.
106. CERCLA §§ 104, 106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1982).
107. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
108. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982).
109. See supra note 8.
110. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 1985). The appellate
court agreed with EPA, stating that if there was an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment, "it is almost ten years old." Id.
11l. "Facility" includes "any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982).
112. CERCLA § 104(e)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(1)(A) (1982).
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property. CERCLA failed to provide the EPA with statutory authority to
enter property which was not actually a part of a site, even if access was
necessary to clean up the site." 3 The result is that Waukegan Harbor remains
contaminated with PCBs.
The court's decision focuses narrowly on whether the statute authorized
the EPA to enter Outboard Marine's property. Had the court found that
the EPA was authorized by statute to enter the property, the court would
have had to address a number of serious constitutional issues raised by the
entry. For example, would the entry have been an unreasonable search or
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment? While the EPA admitted that
obtaining a search warrant would be insufficient to conduct the actual
cleanup, 1 4 it argued that it sought entry solely to determine the nature and
extent of the remedial action required. '15 The agency argued that, because
the activities the EPA sought to perform were less intrusive, a warrant
provided sufficient assurance that the proposed activities were reasonable." 6
The court disagreed with the EPA's not too subtle distinction and stressed
that the EPA was not seeking access to Outboard Marine's property simply
to investigate whether a release had occurred."17 Rather, the EPA wanted to
undertake extensive action under the guise of merely investigating the release.
Both the lower court and the appellate court agreed that the EPA's use of
a search warrant to take soil borings was unusual and without precedent." 8
Furthermore, the appellate court found that the proposed activities were too
intrusive to be merely investigatory and part of a "Phase 1" cleanup; rather,
they were part of the "Phase 2" construction for which there was as yet no
authorization.' 19
An additional constitutional issue would have been whether the EPA's
nonemergency entry pursuant to an ex parte warrant violated the company's
due process rights under the fifth amendment. The Outboard Marine decision
suggests that even if CERCLA had authorized the EPA to enter private
113. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 89.
115. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 86, at 2. The EPA stated, "The warrant contains
no authorization to conduct the actual remedy itself, nor does the EPA seek access at this time
for anything but the limited design activities specified in the warrant." Id.
116. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 86, at 2.
117. 773 F.2d at 889.
118. 773 F.2d at 887; Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1234 (N.D.
Ill. 1985).
119. 773 F.2d at 888. The court stated:
The EPA is alone in denying that surveying the site, placing survey monuments,
locating utility lines, and taking weight-bearing subsurface test samples of soil are
not, as a usual and practical matter, the customary first things to be done at a
construction site. They are too construction-related to be labeled a mere walk-
through, or to be considered as authorized under the ordinary and preliminary
investigative provisions of the statute.
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property to fashion a remedy, an ex parte warrant would not satisfy fifth
amendment procedural due process requirements when no emergency ex-
isted.'20 CERCLA, even as amended, still does not expressly require that the
EPA obtain a search warrant to conduct inspections of private property
pursuant to section 104.121 The constitutional dangers of allowing the EPA
access pursuant to an ex parte warrant in nonemergencies are apparent from
the EPA's conduct in Outboard Marine. The EPA appeared ex parte before
a magistrate and alleged that the site was contaminated with PCBs and that
the EPA required access to design a remedy. This procedure deprived the
company of any opportunity to contest the reasonableness of the "search"
or to assert the EPA's lack of statutory authority for such entry.
Finally, had the court sanctioned the EPA's entry, a further constitutional
question would have been whether the EPA's activities constituted a taking
in violation of the fifth amendment. CERCLA does not authorize the EPA
to take private property. 22 The statute itself contains no provision which
expressly confers eminent domain power upon the EPA. Nor does the
statute's legislative history evidence the requisite unequivocal intent to imply
a congressional grant of power to the EPA.'23 On the contrary, the Act's
legislative history shows that Congress did not contemplate the EPA's entry
onto uncontaminated private property for the purpose of treatment and
storage of hazardous substances on the property. 24 The inclusion of express
grants of eminent domain authority in other federal legislation,' 25 and its
absence from CERCLA, is persuasive evidence of a lack of congressional
intent to give the EPA such authority.
120. Id. at 890.
121. See infra note 134 for the new section 104(e)(3).
122. 773 F.2d at 890.
123. See H.R. REP. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6131.
124. See supra note 6.
125. Express grants of eminent domain encompass numerous subjects, among which are:
armed forces, 10 U.S.C. § 2663 (1982) (authorizing acquisition of property for military training
camps and munitions plants), 10 U.S.C. § 2664 (1982) (land for production of aircraft and
military housing), Richmond National Battlefield Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 423k (1982) (parks);
foriegn relations, 22 U.S.C. § 2681 (1982) (acquisition of land for broadcasting facilities);
mineral lands and mining, 30 U.S.C. § 556 (1982) (acquisition of land adversely affected by
past coal mining practices); Condemnation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 591 (1982) (land for the improve-
ment of rivers and harbors); vetrean's benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 1006 (1982) (national cemeteries);
public recreation, 38 U.S.C. § 5003(a) (1982) (park, parkway and playground system); public
bulidings, property and works, 40 U.S.C. 257 (1982) (public buildings), 40 U.S.C. § 602 (1982)
(land necessary for Administrator to carry out his duties); Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial
Bicentennial Civic Center Act, 40 U.S.C. § 616 (1982) (civic center); Lanham Public War
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1585 (1982) (veteran's housing); Reclamation Acts, 43 U.S.C. § 421
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) (irrigation project); Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978, 45 U.S.C. §
854 (1982) (acquisition of land for railroads); war and national defense, 50 U.S.C. § 100 (1982)
(land for nitrate plants), 50 U.S.C. § 167 (1982) (land for producing and conserving helium),
50 U.S.C. § 2281(h) (1982) (land for defense materials and facilities).
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Even a grant of eminent domain authority would not alleviate all of the
constitutional obstacles to the EPA's proposed action. A property owner
would be entitled to compensation if the EPA's activities constituted a
"taking" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 2 6 While recognizing
a conceptual distinction between a preliminary entry and a constitutionally
compensable taking which requires condemnation procedures, 27 courts have
held that an agency may not effect an unauthorized taking simply by calling
it a preliminary entry. 2 In this case, the EPA made no arguments as to
whether the remedial action would effect a taking of Outboard Marine's
property. 29 The reason for the EPA's silence is clear. Since the EPA knew
it had no authority to take the company's property, the EPA argued that it
was not seeking entry to undertake actual construction. Rather, the EPA
tried to circumvent its lack of authority by claiming that its presence on the
property was solely to undertake preliminary "Phase 1" activities. The
126. This issue is currently being litigated in a pending case, Hendler v. United States, 11
Cl. Ct. 91 (1986). The EPA obtained a court order requiring property owners near a contam-
inated site to grant the EPA access to drill wells and monitor the groundwater. The landowners
alleged takings of their property based on (1) the mere issuance of the order, and (2) the
bringing of contaminated water to the surface. The court granted the EPA's cross-motion for
summary judgment of the first issue but requested further evidence on the second. Id.
127. County of Kane v. Elmhurst Nat'l Bank, 111 Ill. App. 3d 292, 443 N.E.2d 1149, 1154
(1982). Both state and federal courts have held that preliminary entry for survey purposes is
not an exercise of eminent domain power and that a party authorized by statute to make such
an entry need not file condemnation proceedings. See, e.g., Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95
(1932); Dancy v. Alabama Power Co., 198 Ala. 504, 73 So. 901 (1916); McClain v. People, 9
Colo. 190, 11 P. 85, 87 (1886); Chambers v. Cincinnati & G.R. Co., 69 Ga. 320 (1882); Indiana
Mich. Elec. Co. v. Stevenson, 173 Ind. App. 329, 363 N.E.2d 1254 (1977); Thomas v. City of
Horse Cave, 249 Ky. 713, 61 S.W.2d 601 (1933); Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247 (1852);
Steward v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Md. 500 (1855); LaFontaine's Heirs at
Law v. LaFontaine's Heirs at Law, 205 Md. 311, 107 A.2d 653 (Md. App. 1954); Wood v.
Mississippi Power Co., 245 Miss. 103, 146 So. 2d 546 (1962); Walther v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277,
aff'd, 26 Mo. 143 (1857); Litchfield v. Bond, 186 N.Y. 66, 78 N.E. 718 (1906); Oregonian Ry.
Co. v. Hill, 9 Or. 377 (1881); Lewis v. Texas Power & Light Co., 276 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955); Lyon v. Green Bay & Minn. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 538, rev'd on other grounds, 42
Wis. 548 (1877).
128. See, e.g., County of Kane v. Elmhurst Nat'l Bank, 111 Ill. App. 3d 292, 443 N.E.2d
1149 (1982). In that case, the court denied a state agency access to property for the purpose
of taking soil borings. The court found that the soil borings constituted a taking and that the
agency was required to institute condemnation iproceedings prior to the intrusion. The court
stated:
A taking may not be allowed under the guise of a preliminary survey; the right
of entry does not include the right to make permanent appropriation or cause more
than minimal or incidental damage to property; and the entering party is free of
liability only to the extent that the entry or occupation is incidental and incipient
or preliminary.
Id. at 298, 443 N.E.2d at 1153-54 (citing Lichtfield v. Bond, 186 N.Y. 66, 78, 78 N.E. 718,
723 (1906)).
129. Rather, the EPA argued that the taking was irrelevant to the EPA's right to enter the
property. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 86, at 21-22.
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appellate court, however, was not confused by this sophistry. it refused to
separate the EPA's "Phase. 1" activities from the "Phase 2" cdnstruction.
If the court had sanctioned the EPA's initial entry, it would have been in
an inconsistent position of allowing the EPA preliminary access to conduct
extensive "Phase 1" preconstruction work when the EPA might never have
been able to obtain authorization to carry out the final "Phase 2" construc-
tion.
V. IMPACT
The Outboard Marine decision graphically illustrated serious deficiencies
in CERCLA's entry and inspection provisions. For instance, the Act did not
empower the EPA to undertake remedial action absent an imminent and
substantial endangerment to public health or the environment. Nor did
CERCLA authorize the EPA to enter private property which was near or
adjacent to a site even when the site itself was inaccessible and such entry
was essential to effect cleanup. 30 In addition, CERCLA did not designate
the proper mechanism by which the EPA was to obtain access to private
property, either to investigate whether a release had occurred or to conduct
a response action. Finally, CERCLA conferred no authority upon the EPA
to take private property when necessary to conduct remedial action at a
Superfund site.'"
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) 32
also does not clarify this problem. SARA is an attempt to resolve the
deficiencies in CERCLA's entry and inspection provisions. The amendments
grant the EPA expansive authority, in both emergency and nonemergency
situations, to enter private property to investigate and respond to environ-
mental hazards. These amendments, however, may not afford property
owners adequate protection under the fourth and fifth amendments. Thus,
SARA may not survive constitutional challenge, and Congress's intent to
resolve existing statutory deficiencies will be frustrated.
Outboard Marine stands for the proposition that, absent an imminent and
substantial endangerment, the EPA is authorized to enter private property
solely to determine whether a release has occurred. 33 SARA expressly au-
thorizes the EPA to enter private property, not only for the purpose of
determining the need for response but also for the selection of the response
and its implementation.' 34 Such entry is authorized only if the EPA has a
130. But cf. new section 104(e)(3)(D), reproduced infra note 134.
131. For new section 104(j), see infra note 142.
132. See supra note 4.
133. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883, 889 (7th Cir. 1985).
134. SARA amended CERCLA to include new section 104(e)(3), which reads as follows:
ENTRY.-Any [EPA] officer, employee, or representative is authorized to enter
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reasonable basis to believe that a release or threat of release exists. 33 In
addition, the amendments now expand the areas in which the EPA may
enter to include any place from which or to which a hazardous substance
may have been released, any place where a release is or may be threatened,
and any place where entry is needed either to determine the need for response,
to determine the appropriate response, or to effectuate a response. 3 6
The amendments do not address additional statutory deficiencies alluded
to in Outboard Marine. For instance, at the investigatory stage, CERCLA
does not require that the EPA obtain a warrant to inspect private property
to determine whether a release has occurred. The amendments still do not
contain a warrant requirement. Rather, they simply provide that the EPA
may obtain access "in any other lawful manner."' 37 While ignoring the
warrant requirement for entry, the amendments substantially strengthen the
EPA's enforcement power in the event of noncompliance, including a refusal
to grant access to property. Specifically, the EPA is now empowered to issue
a compliance order and to commence a civil action to compel compliance,
in which case a court would be empowered to assess civil penalties of up to
$25,000 for each day of noncompliance. 3 s
The lack of a warrant requirement, coupled with the assessment of civil
penalties for refusal to grant access, are contrary to prior precedent. The
EPA's regulatory powers, like those of OSHA, extend to a broad hetero-
geneous group of industries. Therefore, businesses subject to EPA inspec-
tions, cannot be characterized as "pervasively regulated" within the meaning
at reasonable times any of the following:
(A) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where any
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant may be or has been generated,
stored, treated, disposed of, or transported from.
(B) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property from which
or to which a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant has been or
may have been released.
(C) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where such
release is or may be threatened.
(D) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where entry
is needed to determine the need for response or the appropriate response or
to effectuate a response action under this title.
SARA, § 104(m), 100 Stat. 1613, 1621-23 (1986) (emphasis added). Note the absence of an
explicit warrant requirement.
135. Section 104(e)(1) now reads in part:
The authority [to enter, inspect and obtain samples] may be exercised only if
there is a reasonable basis to believe there may be a release or threat of release of
a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant.
SARA, § 104(m), 100 Stat. 1613, 1622 (1986).
136. See supra note 134.
137. Specifically, section 104(e)(6) now provides that "[n]othing in this subsection shall
preclude the [EPA] from securing access or obtaining information in any other lawful manner."
SARA, § 104(m), 100 Stat. 1613, 1624 (1986). See also supra note 134.
138. See CERCLA, § 104(e)(5), 42 U.S.C. 9604(e)(5) (as added by section 104(m) of SARA,
100 Stat. 1613, 1623 (1986)).
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of Colonnade and Biswell.139 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Barlow's'40
is directly applicable to inspections conducted by the EPA under CERCLA.
Under Barlow's, the fourth amendment precludes the EPA from inspecting
private property without a warrant, unless the owner consents. Furthermore,
the lack of any provisions for an adversarial hearing in conjunction with
the issuance of the warrant, makes the EPA's intrusion in nonemergency
situations constitutionally unreasonable. An ex parte warrant should be
appropriate only where there is a reasonable basis to believe that documents
may be destroyed or site conditions changed if notice was given.' 4'
As a result of the Outboard Marine decision and the EPA's need for
access to private property to effect cleanups in the future, Congress has
included in the Superfund reauthorization a provision which confers eminent
domain authority upon the EPA. 42 This provision authorizes the EPA to
139. The EPA has inspection authority under other environmental statutes. See Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136g (1982); Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1982); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1982); Safe Water
Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-4 (1982); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4912 (1982);
Resource Conservation & Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1982). The Clean Water Act, the Noise Control Act of 1972,
the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act, and the Clean Air Act are similar to CERCLA in
that they regulate a diverse, heterogeneous group of industries. These statutes are distinguishable
from the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and
the Toxic Substances Control Act which regulate well defined types of industries, including
manufacturers and distributors of pesticides, public water systems, and manufacturers and
distributors of hazardous chemicals. Given the character of these industries, they arguably could
be characterized as pervasively regulated. See Note, FDA, EPA, and OSHA Inspections-
Practical Considerations in Light of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 39 MD. L. Rv. 715, 728-31
(1980). Nevertheless, nonconsensual warrantless inspections are prohibited under both the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act and the Safe Water Drinking Act.
140. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
141. Senate Report No. 11 concerning the Superfund Improvement Act of 1985 states:
"[In exigent circumstances, where the [EPA] has a reasonable basis to believe
that documents may be destroyed or site conditions changed if a request for access
or information were made, the [EPA] may obtain an ex parte warrant for entry,
access to documents, sampling or other needed activities."
S. REp. No. II, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1985).
142. New section 1040) states:
(1) Authority.-The [EPA] is authorized to acquire, by purchase, lease, condem-
nation, donation or otherwise, any real property or any interest in real property
that the [EPA] in [its] discretion determines is needed to conduct a remedial action
under this Act. There shall be no cause of action to compel the [EPA] to acquire
any interest in real property under this Act.
(2) State Assurance.-The [EPA] may use the authority of paragraph (1) for a
remedial action only if, before an interest in real estate is acquired under this
subsection, the State in which the interest to be acquired is located assures the
[EPA], through a contract or cooperative agreement or otherwise, that the State
will accept transfer of the interest following completion of the remedial action.
(3) Exemption.-No Federal, State, or local government agency shall be liable
under this Act solely as a result of acquiring an interest in real estate under this
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acquire any interest in real property that the EPA determines is needed to
conduct remedial action under CERCLA. 14a Before the EPA may acquire
the property, however, the state must agree that it will accept transfer of
the property when remedial action is completed. 144 The provision prohibits
a property owner from bringing an action to compel the EPA to acquire an
interest in real property and provides that no government agency will be
held liable as a result of acquiring a property interest.' 45 This grant of
authority may be more sweeping than is needed. To guard against abuse,
CERCLA should require that, prior to acquiring private property for a
Superfund project, the EPA must show that a remedial investigation/feasi-
bility study has been performed and that the study establishes that the
cleanup cannot be properly effected by a less intrusive means.
In addition, the eminent domain provision should include express statutory
guidelines for calculating compensation in a manner which is clear and
comprehensible. Because of the complexities of the statute, ordinary eminent
domain principles will not provide the courts with sufficient guidelines to
ensure that property owners receive just compensation. In Superfund cases,
the property's fair market value prior to cleanup may be an appropriate
measure of compensation when the EPA seeks to take private property
adjacent to a hazardous waste site. It is unclear in what manner compensation
should be calculated when the property taken comprises all or part of a site
and the property owner is a potentially responsible party. 46 The fair market
subsection.
SARA, § 104(j), 100 Stat. 1613, 1624-25 (1986).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. In some instances, as in the case of a successor corporation, the owner of the site may
not be a party potentially responsible for cleanup costs. This creates additional complications
in calculating just compensation. Section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA provides that any owner or
operator of a facility which releases a hazardous substance shall be liable for all necessary
response costs resulting from such a release. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2) (1982). Section 101(20)(A)(iii)
of CERCLA clearly states that the term "owner or operator" as applied to abandoned facilities
includes "any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility
immediately prior to such abandonment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A)(iii) (1982). The term
"person" as defined in section 101(21) of CERCLA includes an individual, firm, corporation,
partnership, or commercial entity. 42 U.S.C. 9601(21) (1982). None of these sections have been
changed by SARA. Normally, it is the corporate entity that will be held accountable for cleanup
costs under CERCLA. See C. Price, Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor Cor-
porations for Abandonment Sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation & Liability Act (CERCLA) (June 13, 1984) (unpublished memorandum). The EPA has
adopted the position that when corporate ownership is transferred from one corporation to
another, the successor corporation is liable for the acts of its predecessor if the new corporation
acquired ownership by merger or consolidation. Id. at 11. If, however, the acquisition was
through the sale or transfer of assets, the successor corporation is not liable unless: (1) the
purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such obligations; (2) the trans-
action amounts to a "de facto" consolidation or merger; (3) the purchasing corporation is
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value of a contaminated hazardous waste site will probably be negligible.
The EPA may acquire the property to perform the cleanup and bring a
subsequent section 107 action14 7 against the property owner, to obtain reim-
bursement for its cleanup costs. In the cost recovery action, the property
owner, having received a negligible amount for the property, will be forced
to bear part or all of the EPA's cleanup costs. The property will then be
transferred to the state rather than to the property owner. Thus, the state
could be the beneficiary of a windfall, a piece of property improved at the
former owner's expense.
The eminent domain provision should also provide clear guidelines as to
when the EPA must compensate the property owner. In emergencies, the
Tucker Act 4 1 would allow the EPA to respond quickly to environmental
hazards, without awaiting the outcome of protracted litigation. The EPA
could also circumvent formal condemnation procedures by taking the prop-
erty pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act,1 49 and determining the precise
amount of compensation in subsequent proceedings. If the property owner
will suffer undue hardship and no imminent or substantial endangerment
exists, prior compensation should be made through formal condemnation
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Outboard Marine illustrates serious defects in the entire statutory frame-
work of the EPA's enforcement program under CERCLA. These defects
affect all phases of an EPA response, from the initial investigatory inspection,
until the time that remedial action is completed. In response to these defi-
ciencies, Congress has amended CERCLA to clarify and strengthen the
EPA's authority to respond to environmental hazards. Unfortunately, these
amendments do not adequately protect property rights guaranteed by the
fourth and fifth amendments. Unless these rights are adequately protected,
the reauthorization will be subject to judicial challenge and the EPA's
enforcement program will be further frustrated.
Mary Beth Miller
merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the transaction was fraudulently entered
into in order to escape liability. Id. at 11-12. Nevertheless, a successor corporation may be
liable for the acts of the predecessor corporation if the new corporation continues substantially
the same business operations as the selling corporation. See also Note, Torts-Product Lia-
bility-Successor Corporation Strictly Liable for Defective Products Manufactured by the
Predecessor Corporation, 27 VELt. L. REv. 411, 412 (1982).
147. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
148. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-2931 (1982).
149. 40 U.S.C. § 258a-f (1982).
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